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Excess Earnings: Redefining the
Professional Goodwill Doctrine
California courts have continued to expand the traditional defini-
tions of community property.' Faced with difficult questions such as
whether education,2 enhanced earning capacity,3 and pensions4 may
be considered subject to community property principles,5 the courts
have considered whether the definition of community property should
be broadened.' One line of cases expanding the definition of com-
munity property is based upon a recognition that the marital com-
munity may have an interest in the goodwill of a business or profes-
sional practice.'
1. Under California law community p'roperty is "property acquired by husband and wife,
or either, during marriage, when not acquired as the separate property of either." CAL. CIV.
CODE §687. California Civil Code §5110 provides "Except as provided . . . all real property
. . . and all personal property . . . acquired during the marriage . . . is community property
.... " Id. Separate property is defined as "property . . . owned . . . before marriage, and
that acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, with the rents, issues, and profits
thereof . . . ." CAL. CIv. CODE §§5107, 5108.
2. Marriage of Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982), affirmed in part, reversed in part,
37 Cal. 3d 762, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
professional education was neither separate nor community property. 184 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, a recent amendment to the Family Law Act, pro-
viding for reimbursement for "community contributions to education or training of a party
that substantially enhances the earning capacity of the party," was held applicable and the
case was remanded for a determination of whether and in what amount reimbursement should
be awarded. 37 Cal. 3d at 767-68, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359; CAL CIV. CODE §4800.3 (b)(1). The
court did not address expressly the holding of the lower court that professional education was
not property subject to community property principles. See 37 Cal. 3d at 767-68, 209 Cal.
Rptr. at 356-59 (1984). Hence, the question in those cases reaching a determination that profes-
sional education is not subject to division in a marital dissolution proceeding remains unanswered
expressly by the California Supreme Court. Id. See generally Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal.
App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677 (1979) (ruling that the trial court did not err in
refusing to admit evidence regarding value of legal education). Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App.
2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969) (holding that education is an intangible property
right that cannot be valued for division between the spouses in a divorce proceeding).
3. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354.
4. Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE §4800(a) "Except upon written agreement ... or on oral stipulation
. . . the court shall . . . divide the community property . . . equally." Id.
6. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 59-90 and accompanying text. Other jurisdictions have followed California
in recognizing such an interest. See, e.g., Marriage of Lukens, 558 P.2d 279, 282-83 (Wash.
App. 1976), Hurley v. Hurley, 615 P.2d 256, 259 (N.M. 1980). But cf. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d
761, 764 (Tex. 1972) (concluding that the goodwill of a medical practitioner merely was an
expectancy that was not property subject to division under a divorce decree).
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Traditional definitions of goodwill include the expectation of con-
tinued public patronage by a business concern.8 Historically, com-
petitive advantages enjoyed by an individual have not been regarded
as goodwill.9 Appellate courts in California have recognized, however,
that the goodwill of a professional may be subject to division upon
marital dissolution, regardless of the fact that the professional is a
sole practitioner and the existence of any goodwill is a result of per-
sonal skill, judgment, and reputation.'" Trial courts in California have
found community goodwill in situations involving bankers, engineers,
insurance agents, pharmacists, professors, sales representatives, and
social workers." As a result of these rulings, the appellate courts of
California soon may be faced with the question whether goodwill,
or a similar intangible asset, exists when the spouse is a salaried
employee who has developed substantially greater earning capacity than
other individuals in the same occupation in the same or similar
community."'
Initially, this author will review the varying definitions of goodwill
that cause confusion in this area of the law.' 3 A brief review of cases
recognizing professional goodwill as subject to community property
principles will be provided.' This author next will establish that good-
will is personal in origin,' 5 and that court decisions holding that pro-
fessional goodwill of the marital community can be subject to divi-
sion upon marital dissolution implicitly recognize that excess earnings
result from the existence of goodwill.' 6 Excess earnings can be defined
as earnings in excess of a normal return on all assets, including labor
and services.'" Recognition that excess earnings are property divisible
upon dissolution of the marital community eliminates the potential
for confusion in applying traditional goodwill definitions in the com-
munity property context.' 8 Since excess earnings are the result of the
8. See infra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
9. Id. Earning capacity and future income potential are not the same as professional
goodwill. Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 463, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 679. Future income potential
and earning capacity may exist without the existence of goodwill. See id.
10. See infra notes 50-90 and accompanying text.
11. See Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Prop-
erty, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181, 1214 (1981).
12. See id. at 1210, 1214-15.
13. See infra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 50-90 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 106-19 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
17. See id.
18. See id.
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existence of goodwill, 9 excess earnings should be considered com-
munity property regardless of whether an ownership interest in a pro-
fessional practice or business concurrently exists. 20
Recent California case law addressing the question whether the ex-
cess earnings of an employee are subject to division will be analyzed
to illustrate that the courts may fail to divide properly all community
assets unless excess earnings are recognized as divisible community
property.2' Commensurate with this analysis, a brief review of factors
giving rise to the existence of excess earnings will be provided.22 First,
however, to understand the conceptual confusion that exists in a discus-
sion regarding goodwill, traditional and current definitions will be
surveyed.23
TRADITIONAL GOODWILL DEFINITIONS
Definitions of goodwill are many and varied. 24 Goodwill, like many
intangibles, has been regarded as a slippery, elusive, ephemeral, and
speculative asset.2 Definitions of goodwill generally include terms can-
noting above-average success and often associate goodwill with marked
profitability.26 Goodwill definitions largely have developed in com-
mercial and business law settings.2 7 Early common law cases restricted
this concept by defining goodwill as a probability that an established
clientele will resort to the customary place of business.2" Modern
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See infra notes 130-92 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
24. Foreman, Conflicting Theories of Goodwill, 22 CoLU?. L. REv. 638, 646 (1922). Good-
will has been described as a benefit or advantage
... which is acquired by an establishment beyond the mere value of the capital, stock,
funds or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage
and encouragement, which it receives from constant or habitual customers on account
of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or
punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient
partialities or prejudices.
J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERsmP §84 (1968), quoting from J. STORY, PART-
NERSHMP §99 (3d ed. 1950).
25. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHiP §84, 447 (1968); see Udinsky, An
Economist's View of Professional Goodwill in a Community Property Setting, 5 COMMUNITY
PROP. J. 91, 92 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Driskill v. Thompson, 141 Cal. App. 2d 479, 484, 296 P.2d 834, 838 (1956);
Blut v. Katz, 115 A.2d 119, 124 (N.J. Super 1955).
27. See infra notes 29-50 and accompanying text.
28. Id.
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statutory definitions are more inclusive than the common law, defin-
ing goodwill as an expectation of public patronage.29
The law of goodwill appears to have originated in an old English
decision, which held that an individual could sell the right to com-
pete along with a business.3 0 Subsequently, the treatment and defini-
tion of goodwill evolved against the background of commercial and
business settings.' The cases reflecting this evolution generally hold
that the goodwill of a business cannot exist independent of the physical
assets to which they are incident,32 and that the goodwill of a business
may not be sold separately from those physical assets. 3
Lord Eldon's definition of goodwill in Crutwell v. Lye3' often is
cited for the proposition that goodwill is "nothing more than the pro-
bability that the old customers will resort to the old place." 35 This
definition has been criticized as limiting goodwill to benefits that derive
from a well-known location. 6 These benefits have been referred to
as "location goodwill." 37 In an early case, the California court, in
Dodge Stationary Co. v. Dodge,38 broadened the definition of good-
will to include the "well-founded expectation of continued public
patronage." 39 A modern statutory definition that codifies the holding
of Dodge0 is provided in California Business and Professions Code
section 14100, which defines goodwill simply as the "expectation of
continued public patronage.""
The Business and Professions Code definition of goodwill is cited
often in California case law recognizing goodwill as an asset subject
29. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §14100; see infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
30. J. CoMMoNs, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPrrAmLSM 263 (1968). The case described by
Commons involved a merchant who sold his stock of goods at a price in excess of their inven-
tory value and simultaneously agreed not to compete with the business of the purchaser. Id.
at 263-64. When the seller breached his promise not to compete, the buyer brought suit and
obtained a favorable decision. Id. at 264. Prior to this decision, the courts consistently held
that any contract in restraint of trade was void and even criminal. Id. By holding that an in-
dividual lawfully might sell the right to compete along with a business, this case laid the foun-
dations for the modern concept of goodwill. See id. at 263-66.
31. Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Marital Dissolution: Is it Property or Another Name
for Alimony?, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 27, 29 (1977).
32. See, e.g., Dodge Stationery Co. v. Dodge, 145 Cal. 380, 386-89, 78 P. 879, 881-82 (1904).
33. See id.
34. 17 Ves. 335, 34 Eng. Rep. 129 (1810).
35. Id. at 346, 34 Eng. Rep. at 134.
36. J. Commons, supra note 30, at 267.
37. Id.
38. 145 Cal. 380, 78 P. 879 (1904).
39. Id. at 388, 78 P. at 882.
40. Id.
41. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §14100.
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to division at marital dissolution.12 One example is the case of Golden
v. Golden,"3 holding that the goodwill of a professional practice should
be subject to division upon dissolution of the marriage." Although
the community property case law dealing with professional goodwill
after Golden"5 frequently refers to the definition of goodwill contained
in the Business and Professions Code," reliance upon that definition
is not required in the family law context. "7 As a result, this definition
is not dispositive of all circumstances in which an award of goodwill
can be made upon division of the marital community." Thus, a brief
examination of the case law concerning professional goodwill is
necessary to determine whether the courts improperly have limited
the instances in which an award of goodwill may be given in a marital
dissolution.49
THE PROFEssIoNAL GOODWILL DOCTRINE
The divisibility of the goodwill of a sole practitioner professional
or proprietor as community property is well established.5" In 1969,
the California appellate courts first recognized the divisibility of good-
will of a sole practitioner professional as an asset of the marital
community.5 Subsequently, the appellate courts also recognized that
a sole proprietor may have divisible goodwill. 52 California courts first
recognized that the marital community has an interest in the good-
will of a sole practioner professional in Golden v. Golden.53
A. Golden v. Golden
Several cases prior to Golden v. Golden recognized in dicta that
the goodwill of a professional practice should be subject to division
upon dissolution of the marital community. 54 Golden, however, was
42. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
43. 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969).
44. Id. at 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
45. See, e.g., Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974).
46. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §14100.
47. See id. §14000 (providing that section 14100 is not necessarily applicable to other sec-
tions of the Code).
48. See infra notes, 74-193 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 50-90 and accompanying text.
50. See id.; see also Lurvey, supra note 31, at 30.
51. See infra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 72-90 and accompanying text.
53. 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969).
54. Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 251, 301 P.2d 90, 94-96 (1956); Brawman
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the first case to decide whether the goodwill of a professional prac-
tice should be considered community property subject to division."
In Golden, the husband was a sole practitioner physician and the wife
was a housewife.16 Upon dissolution, the trial court made an elaborate
division of the community property, including the allocation of $32,500
for the goodwill of the medical practice of the husband." The decree
awarded the goodwill to the husband, but required him to make
periodic payments until the wife received her one-half interest in the
total community assets, including the value of the goodwill of the
medical practice. 8
On appeal, the husband argued that the trial court erred in finding
the goodwill of his practice to be community property. 9 He presented
authority supporting the position that no allowance should be made
for goodwill if the goodwill is dependent upon the personal reputa-
tion and skill of a particular person. 61 In rejecting this argument, the
court cited with approval several prior cases which recognized in dicta
that the goodwill of a professional practice must be considered in
evaluating the extent and nature of community assets for purposes
of property division. 61
The Golden court held that the goodwill of a sole practitioner pro-
fessional practice should be considered in determining the appropriate
award of community property to the nonprofessional spouse. 62 In the
context of a marital dissolution, the court noted, the practice of the
sole practitioner will continue with the same intangible value that
existed during the marriage. 63 The court reasoned that this treatment
was justified by community property principles requiring recompense
for contributions made to increase the value of property during the
marriage. 64 Acknowledging that the wife in Golden made a contribu-
tion to the value of the goodwill of the husband's medical practice,
the court stated that the wife was entitled to compensation."
v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 882, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109-10 (1962); Fritschi v. Teed,
213 Cal. App. 2d 718, 726, 29 Cal. Rptr. 114, 119 (1963).
55. 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735.
56. Id. at 404, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
65. Id.
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Subsequent cases have followed Golden, uniformly holding that the
goodwill of a sole practitioner professional practice is community prop-
erty subject to division upon marital dissolution." Many of these later
cases involved the traditional professional practices of medicine or
law6 7 and primarily decided whether an appropriate method was used
to value the goodwill of the practice." One case that followed Golden,
however, did not involve a traditional professional practice. 9 In Mar-
riage of Rives,7" the professional goodwill doctrine elucidated in Golden
was applied to a spouse involved in a business. 7
B. In re Marriage of Rives
In Marriage of Rives, the husband was involved in the business
of raising, selling, and making cages for queen bees. 72 During the
marriage, the primary responsibility of the husband was the queen
bee breeding business and the primary responsibility of the wife was
the queen bee cage business. 73 Upon dissolution, the trial court deter-
mined that the queen bee and the queen bee cage businesses were
community property. 4 The trial court valued these assets and awarded
the queen bee business to the husband and the cage business to the
wife. 75 The trial court set the value and made community property
divisions of the queen bee business, including values for the physical
assets and the goodwill of the business.76
On appeal, the husband argued that no goodwill existed in the queen
bee business.77 Moreover, he contended that even if any goodwill prop-
erly could be found, the valuation method employed was improper.78
66. See Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974); Marriage of
Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974); Marriage of Barnert, 85 Cal. App.
3d 413, 149 Cal. Rptr. 616 (1978); Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr.
668 (1979); Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 160 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1979).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Marriage of Rives, 130 Cal. App. 3d 138, 181 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1982).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 145, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
72. Id. at 146, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 148, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
75. Id. at 148, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
76. Id. The trial court set the value of the queen bee business at $90,000, noting that
this represented a value for the physical assets of $9,185 and a value for the goodwill of the
business of $30,000. Id. at 149, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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The court of appeals found that the skill, experience, and reputation
of the husband in the queen bee industry was similar to that of a
professional practice."9 The court observed that previous case law had
not limited expressly community property goodwill to situations in-
volving professional practices.80 The court then concluded that the
business involved was so similar to a professional practice that, as
a matter of law, a determination that a queen bee business could
not have divisible community property goodwill would be improper."'
By concluding that the business involved in Rives was so similar
to a professional practice that the business could have divisible com-
munity property goodwill, the court made clear that the professional
goodwill doctrine is not limited in application only to professional
spouses.82 One important factual similarity between Golden and Rives,
however, is the existence of an ownership interest in a business or
professional practice. 3 This similarity demonstrates that the Califor-
nia courts are willing to recognize the existence of divisible goodwill
in cases in which a spouse has an ownership interest in a business
organization such as a partnership or corporation. 4
Adso noteworthy is the fact that in both Golden and Rives, the
spouse, against whom a claim for goodwill was made, was a sole
practitioner." The goodwill found to exist was dependent upon the
individual skill, reputation, and judgment of the spouse and, therefore,
could not be sold or otherwise transferred to a third party."6
Transferability of goodwill, then, is not determinative in California
regarding whether a spouse will have a successful claim to the good-
will of the community.8 7
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. See id.; see also Marriage of Lotz, 120 Cal. App. 3d 379, 384, 174 Cal. Rptr. 618,
621 (1981) (holding that the goodwill of a closely held corporation is subject to division upon
dissolution of the marital community).
82. See 130 Cal. App. 3d at 149, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
83. See Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735, 737 (1969);
Marriage of Rives, 130 Cal. App. 3d 138, 146, 181 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575 (1982).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Geffen v. Moss, 53 Cal. App. 3d 215, 125 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1975). W. REPPY,
ComtuNmr PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 169 (1980).
87. Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 644, 615 P.2d 256, 259 (1980) (noting that salability
of goodwill is not dispositive of the question whether goodwill is divisible community prop-
erty); Note, Divorce - Division of Property - Professional Corporation May Have Valuable
Goodwill, Apart from Person of Individual Member, That Must Be Considered in Property
Settlement on Divorce, 11 ST. MARY's L.J. 222, 233 (1979). Godwill has value regardless of
marketability. Id. Lurvey, supra note 31, at 30, argues that professional goodwill should not
be divisible upon marital dissolution because the goodwill is only an entry on an accounting
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What remains unclear is whether an award for goodwill is an award
based upon the ownership interest of the spouse in the goodwill of
a business organization or whether the goodwill award is a community
property division of the goodwill incident to the skill, reputation, and
judgment of the individual spouse.8 8 Cases such as Golden and Rives
do not address this issue since they involve sole practitioners.8 9
Individuals without an ownership interest in a business organiza-
tion that has goodwill may have a quantum of skill, reputation, and
judgment tantamount to that of the sole practitioners in Golden and
Rives.90 Hence, the question whether skillful, reputable, and wise in-
dividuals may have divisible goodwill without having a concurrent
ownership interest in a business organization remains unanswered. To
arrive at a valid conclusion regarding that question, the constraints
imposed by adherence to conventional goodwill definitions must be
considered.
DEFINITIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON EXPANSION OF THE
PROFESSIONAL GOODWmL DOCTRINE
Conventional goodwill definitions may limit the application of the
professional goodwill doctrine. To decide whether these limitations
are appropriate in the community property context, the applicability
of general goodwill definitions should be considered. Whether these
general definitions are applicable in the community property setting
can be resolved by examining the conceptual basis for goodwill.
A. Inapplicability of Traditional Goodwill Definitions
Traditionally, goodwill could not be separated from the physical
assets that gave rise to the existence of this intangible asset.9 ' As an
incident to physical assets of a business, goodwill could not exist ab-
sent an ownership interest in a going business concern or professional
practice. 92 A salaried employee generally does not have an ownership
statement until an actual sale. Id. This view incorrectly assumes that alienability must be an
attribute of community property. See Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 847-48, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 638 (1976). For instance, non-vested pension rights are considered divisible com-
munity property despite the fact that such rights are only contingent and nontransferable. Id.
88. See Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d at 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 737; Rives, 130 Cal. App.
3d at 146, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Dodge Stationary Co. v. Dodge 145 Cal. 380, 386-89, 78 P. 879, 881-82 (1904).
92. See id.
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interest in the business of an employer. 93 Since the salaried employee
is not involved in ownership of physical assets to which the goodwill
is deemed incident, the employee has no claim to the goodwill of
the business or professional practice if the traditional definition of
goodwill is applied.94 Assuming a traditional definition of goodwill
is applied, the contention that a salaried employee may have divisible
goodwill at dissolution seems inappropriate. 9
Whether the narrow, conventional definition of goodwill bars con-
sideration of a claim that goodwill may exist absent an ownership
interest in a business or professional practice was presented in a re-
cent Los Angeles Superior Court divorce proceeding. 96 In this case
the wife argued that the husband had "executive goodwill" as a result
of his skill, reputation, personality, and judgment in the development
and production of feature films for the companies that employed him. 9'
The husband noted that all authority cited by the wife involved factual
situations in which a spouse had some type of ownership interest in
a professional practice or business, relying upon traditional defini-
tions of goodwill. 98 Based upon that observation, the husband con-
tended that an employee cannot have divisible goodwill. 99
The trial court concluded that the husband had no divisible
goodwill.' °° The basis for this conclusion was undisclosed. 10' The court,
therefore, could have arrived at this decision based upon considera-
tions of law or fact.'0 2 The court may have decided, as a matter of
law, that an executive does not have divisible goodwill because the
executive does not have an ownership interest in the goodwill of the
93. See id.
94. See supra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
95. See id.; see also Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487, 492-93 (N.D. 1978) (holding
that entrepreneurial ability could not be considered an asset subject to division upon divorce).
The Nastrom court, without explanation, concluded that entrepreneurial skills are analogous
to, but not the same as, professional goodwill. Id. This conclusion demonstrates the difficulty
courts have in applying traditional definitions of goodwill to a community property issue. See
id. The analogy is apparent if excess earnings are seen as the result of goodwill. See infra
notes 120-92 and accompanying text. The analogy exists because superior entreprenurial ability,
like professional goodwill, produces excess earnings. See Udinsky, supra note 25, at 95. The
distinction lies in the fact that entreprenurial skills do not give rise to an ownership interest
of the type that exists in a traditional professional practice. See supra notes 50-90 and accom-
panying text.
96. Miller, Divorce in the Entertainment Industry - Some Special Problems, 5 CosMI/ENT
L.J. 43, "58-60 (1982).
97. Id. at 59.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 60.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
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company for which the executive works.'0 3 On the other hand, the
court may have concluded, based upon the evidence presented, that
the husband did not have any personal goodwill as a matter of fact.'0 4
Regardless of the rationale used by the trial court, the argument
of the husband exemplifies the difficulty inherent in using traditional
goodwill definitions in a community property setting. The question
whether an ownership interest in a business or professional practice
is required before a court properly may find that goodwill or a like
intangible constitutes a community asset should not be resolved by
mere reliance upon a definition of goodwill developed apart from con-
siderations applicable to community property law. Fundamental prin-
ciples of community property law require that all property acquired
during marriage be considered and treated as community property.'0 5
If the historical concepts of goodwill are applied in the community
property setting, the courts would be foreclosed from recognizing divisi-
ble goodwill except in the limited case of a spouse holding an owner-
ship interest in a business organization that has goodwill.
Spouses of individuals who have skill, reputation, and judgment
equivalent to the sole practitioners in Golden and Rives without a
concurrent ownership interest in a business organization would not
be allowed a recovery even though no economic differences exist be-
tween the person with an ownership interest and the person without
the ownership interest. Rather than apply the historical notions of
goodwill in the context of modern community property law, the con-
ceptual basis of goodwill should be analyzed to determine whether
the professional goodwill doctrine should be extended to include good-
will or a similar intangible of an employee as an asset of the marital
community.
B. Personal Goodwill: The Goodwill of an Employee
The goodwill of a business always begins as personal goodwill.'0 6
Later, after a going business is established, a person may sell business
or location goodwill without parting with personal goodwill. 07 Per-
sonal goodwill is sold when an individual covenants not to act in
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. CAL. CIV. CODE §4800(a) (providing for equal division of all community property).
106. J. Commons, supra note 30, at 267; see also Laube, Goodwill in Professional Partner-
ships, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 303, 326 (1927) (noting that goodwill is largely personal in origin).
107. J. Commons, supra note 30, at 267-68; Wright, Nature and Basis of Legal Goodwill,
24 ILL. L. REv. 20, 32 n.65 (1929).
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a prescribed manner during some future time.' 8 What actually is sold
is the liberty to act in a manner that brings income in excess of what
competitors are able to procure.' 9 In a competitive market, personal
goodwill exists as a result of the ability of the individual to overcome
competition and obtain consent and reciprocity in the marketplace." 0
As alternatives and competitive advantages decrease, goodwill also is
diminished."' Conceptually, goodwill is the private property of a
definite person or concern, resulting from successful past
performance." 2 The return on the investment in time and effort that
establishes goodwill carries a present value." 3 Similar to other valuable
investments, the individual or concern possessing goodwill has a
reasonable expectation of continued future income.' Thus, an
employee may have goodwill that is personal and can be carried with
the employee to a new employer.'
Consequently, goodwill can be described as a form of differential
advantage."' This differential advantage gives rise to earnings in ex-
cess of a normal return on assets including labor and services
provided. 17 The existence of goodwill, whether personal or commer-
cial, results in excess earnings."' The determination whether personal
goodwill can be regarded as an asset subject to community property
principles is made easier by recognizing that goodwill results in ex-
cess earnings.'19
SOLUTION: RECOGNITION OF COMMUNITY EXCESS EARNINGS
Excess earnings can be defined as earnings over and above a nor-
mal return for similar services or tangible assets, primarily attributable
to exclusive control over an economic resource. 20 In a business setting,
this resource may be the location of the business or an established
reputation for quality service.' 2' In a professional practice, the
108. J. Commons, supra note 30, at 267-68.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 271.
111. Id. at 272.
112. Id. at 272-73.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 273.
115. See Wright, supra note 107, at 32 n. 65.
116. Id. at 25.
117. See Udinsky, supr note 25, at 93.
118. See id. at 92-93.
119. See id. at 92-93, 95.
120. Id. at 93.
121. See id.
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economic resource may be the personality or unique talent of the
professional. 22 For an employee, excess earnings may result from
education, personality, special talent, business acquaintances, and other
qualifications that confer advantage, differential treatment, and a
relatively greater number of future employment options.'23
In holding that goodwill of a sole practitioner professional practice
or a sole proprietorship is subject to community property principles,
the California courts implicitly recognize that the present value of
community excess earnings is subject to division upon divorce."' Once
the professional goodwill doctrine is recognized as dividing the pre-
sent value of community excess earnings, the courts need not con-
sider whether an ownership interest in a business or professional prac-
tice exists. ' 25 The realization that goodwill is personal and that good-
will results in excess earnings means that an ownership interest in a
business or professional practice need not exist in order to claim that
the marital community has an interest in the personal goodwill of
an employee. 2 An acknowledgment that the professional goodwill
doctrine actually is a recognition of excess earnings as a community
asset would serve to eliminate confusion caused by use of the term
"goodwill."' 27 The confusion can be avoided by directing the atten-
tion of the court to the question whether excess earnings exist rather
than focusing on goodwill. 121 Since the courts actually are dividing
excess earnings of the marital community, rather than goodwill, the
extension of the professional goodwill doctrine is appropriate and pro-
blems caused by application of historical and traditional definitions
of goodwill in the community property setting are avoided more
122. Id.
123. See id. For example, an associate employed by a large national law firm does not
have an ownership interest in the goodwill of the firm, but, depending on compensation re-
ceived, the associate may have excess earnings. See id. The inequity in supposing that the pro-
fessional goodwill doctrine requires an ownership interest in a professional practice or business
may be seen under the facts of the following hypothetical. Two attorneys with essentially the
same qualifications begin practice. One chooses to associate with a large, reputable law firm.
The second chooses to begin practice as a sole practitioner. After several years of practice,
they both achieve substantially similar and comparatively high levels of income. If the profes-
sional goodwill doctrine requires an ownership interest, only the spouse of the sole practitioner
will have a claim upon the excess earnings even though both attorneys may have similar excess
earnings. See id.
124. See id. at 95-96; Marriage of Fenton, 134 Cal. App. 3d 451, 463, 184 Cal. Rptr. 597,
602 (1982).
125. See id.
126. See Udinsky, supra note 25, at 93.
127. See id.; see supra notes 24-49, 91-119 and accompanying text.
128. See Udinsky supra note 25, at 95-96.
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easily.' With this solution in mind, an examination of recent deci-
sions in cases that considered whether the goodwill of an employee
is divisible demonstrates the preferability of the proposed solution
to limitation of the professional goodwill doctrine.
RECENT CASES AND ExcEss EARNINGS
Recent case law demonstrates the potential difficulty courts face
when applying historical definitions of goodwill that have developed
apart from community property law. 3 When excess earnings are
recognized as community property, however, the decision of the court
also should address the economic consequences of the monetarily suc-
cessful marital community.' 3' Since excess earnings result from the
existence of goodwill, the same factors currently used to determine
whether goodwill exists can be used to decide the existence of excess
earnings. 32 Therefore, existing case law provides guidelines that can
be employed to determine the existence of excess earnings."'
Among the factors a trial court should consider to determine whether
excess earnings exist are age, health, demonstrated past earnings power,
skill, knowledge, comparative success, and reputation in the community
for judgment. 3 ' If excess earnings are not recognized as community
property, the economic consequences of the marital community will
not be divided consistently and uniformly based upon the unrelated
consideration of the business form under which the excess earnings
129. See Fenton, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 463, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
130. See infra notes 130-92 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 174-192 and accompanying text.
132. See Udinsky, supra note 25, at 95. Excess earnings may exist regardless of whether
an ownership interest in a business or professional practice is found. See id. If the courts recognize
excess earnings rather than merely professional goodwill, guidelines already exist to aid in a
determination of whether excess earnings exist. See, e.g., Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App.
3d 93, 109-10, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 68 (1974).
133. See, e.g., marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58.
134. Id. at 109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 68. The trial court also should be required to determine
whether the excess earnings, if any, are separate property, community property, or both, under
the general rules for property division in a marital dissolution action. See supra note I and
accompanying text. As with goodwill, the existence of excess earnings is a question of fact
for determination by the trial court. Marriage of King, 150 Cal. App. 3d 304, 309, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 716, 719 (1983). Valuation questions, although beyond the scope of this comment, also
will be a question of fact for the trial court. See generally J. Stein, Business Appraisers and
Appraisals, 1983 FAmELY LAW SYmpsiOSM, FAMImy LAW SEcTIoN Los ANGELES CouNTY BAR
ASSOCIATION (providing an excellent review of professional goodwill valuation methods used
in recent case law of California); Comment, Valuation of Professional Goodwill Upon Marital
Dissolution, 7 Sw. U. L. REv. 186 (1975) (providing a review of valuation methods commonly
used and suggesting two alternative valuation methods).
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developed. 35 The case of In re Rosan' 36 illustrates the inequities of
failure to recognize excess earnings as community property.
A. In re Rosan
In Rosan, the husband began work as an employee in a jewelry
firm shortly after marriage.' 37 He was employed by the firm for six-
teen years and at the time of trial was a sales manager and super-
visor of two stores for several years.'38 During the marriage he also
acquired fifteen percent of the capital stock of his corporate employer
and was vice president of the corporation. 9 The wife was not
employed during the marriage.' 40 The court noted that the parties were
accustomed to living in a style commensurate with the substantial earn-
ings of the husband.' 4 '
The trial court made divisions of community assets and liabilities
that included an award to the husband of the stock of the jewelry
firm valued at $30,711.142 Ownership of this stock was subject to a
written agreement between the husband and the only other shareholder
of the corporation, who owned eighty-five percent of the stock.'4 3
This agreement provided that the shares of the husband could not
be transferred or sold to anyone other than the corporation or the
other stockholder without prior written consent.'4 4 In the event that
the husband desired to sell the stock, the corporation and the other
stockholder, in that order, had the right to purchase the stock for
its "computed value" or the price offered to the husband by a third
party, whichever was lower. 4 5 "Computed value" was to be deter-
mined by a formula based upon the book asset value of the corpora-
tion with certain adjustments, but excluding any allowance for
goodwill. 46 If the husband voluntarily quit his employment or was
terminated for just cause, the corporation and the other stockholder,
in that order, had a right to purchase the stock for seventy percent
135. See infra notes 137-73 and accompanying text.
136. 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1972).
137. Id. at 888, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 889, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
141. Id. at 888, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
142. Id. at 889, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
143. Id. at 890, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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of the computed value of the stock.'47 The trial court, in determining
the value of the stock to be $30,711, decided that the interest of the
community in the stock was seventy percent of the computed value
of the stock. 4
On appeal, the wife argued that the trial court erred by failing to
give consideration to the possible existence of goodwill.' 9 The wife
contended that this valuation wrongly utilized the computed value as
defined by the stock transfer agreement and that this method wrongly
excluded an allowance for goodwill.' 0 The wife suggested that if thejewelry firm were to be acquired by another corporation the stock
would have a far greater value than the computed value.' 5' The court,
however, concluded that since no evidence of any planned merger
or acquisition was presented, and in view of the restrictive conditions
placed upon the disposition of the stock, the trial court was justified
in assessing the value of the stock at seventy percent of the com-
puted value.' 52 The court did not consider, at this point in the opin-
ion, whether the employee had goodwill or excess earnings that should
have been subject to division.'" The court only considered whether
the goodwill of the business organization in which the employee held
stock was to be included in the community property division. 15 4
Since the decision of the court foreclosed recovery of the value of
any goodwill in the business in which the husband had an ownership
interest, the only other possible theory for recovery of goodwill would
have been a contention that the husband had goodwill subject to divi-
sion as an employee.' 55 The court then considered whether the hus-
band could have divisible goodwill as an employee, referring to this
type of individual goodwill as established employment.' 5 6 In making
this reference to established employment, the court cited portions of
two opinions discussing goodwill. 5 7 The discussion of goodwill in these
147. Id. at 890, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 898, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 304. The court did not expressly define what constitutes
established employment. Id. However, the court did consider the term to be synonymous with
earning capacity. Id.
156. Id.; Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 793, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136 (1969); Brawman
v. Brawman 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 882-83, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109-10 (1962); Lurvey, supra
note 31, at 82 n.63.
157. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 898, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 304; Lurvey, supra note 31, at 80-82.
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opinions led the court to observe that in cases involving a self-employed
professional or proprietor, the spouse may recover for contributions
during the marriage made to the development of established
employment.' 58
The Rosan court viewed the finding of goodwill in professional prac-
tice cases as a way for the courts to divide established employment
as community property.'5 9 Rather than divide any community excess
earnings, the court chose to award to the wife, as increased support
obligations, the equivalent of what would have been divisible excess
earnings or goodwill had the husband been self-employed.' 60 Reason-
ing that established employment cannot be considered divisible pro-
perty like goodwill, the court concluded that established employment
should be considered when determining the appropriate support award
to the wife.' 6 ' Thus, the Rosan court believed that a division of good-
will as community property was the method employed to compensate
a nonprofessional spouse for contributions during the marriage made
to increase the earning capacity of the professional spouse to a level
above that of other similarly situated professionals. 62 As a result,
this court subjected an asset, which would otherwise be community
property, to the uncertainties of a support award based solely upon
a consideration of the business form under which the excess earnings
developed. ' 63
If excess earnings are considered divisible community property,
California courts faced with circumstances similar to Rosan will not
be forced to decide whether an individual litigant receives income under
a particular business form before deciding if the marital community
has a divisible interest in the economic result of goodwill.' 64 Excess
earnings exist regardless of whether a spouse is an employee or a
sole practitioner. '6 Furthermore, this approach requires the courts
158. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 898, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 304; Lurvey, supra note 31, at 80-82.
159. Id.
160. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 898, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
161. Id., Lurvey, supra note 31, at 80-82.
162. See id.
163. See 24 Cal. App. 3d at 898, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 304; see also Bruch, The Definition
and Division of Marital Property in California: Towards Parity and Simplicity, 33 HASTINGS
L. J. 769, 816 (1982). Modifiable spousal support awards are not a proper method of compen-
sating for inequitable community property divisions. Id. Significant spousal support orders rarely
are entered and enforced. Id. The support award also may terminate before adequate recompense
on death or remarriage of either spouse. Id. More importantly, determinations regarding
characterization of property for purposes of marital dissolution should not be dependent on
the discretion of the trial court as are determinations of spousal support. Marriage of Brown,
15 Cal. 3d 838, 848, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (1976).
164. See infra notes 174-92 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
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simply to consider the existence of excess earnings in making spousal
support awards when the spouse happens to be an employee. 66 The
economic consequences of the existence of excess earnings are the same
in both circumstances, but excess earnings will be handled disparately
based solely upon the unrelated coincidence of the business form under
which a spouse earns income.167 Recognition that excess earnings are
divisible would preclude this arbitrary treatment and allow courts to
divide equitably the community assets, rather than forcing the courts
to increase spousal support awards depending upon whether the litigant
is self-employed or an employee. 68
An approach similar to the one proposed by this author was
employed ten years after Rosan in Marriage of Fenton.'69 Fenton
presented facts similar to Rosan since both involved agreements
excluding the value of goodwill upon disposition of the shares of the
corporation held by an employee.' 70 Both courts also separately con-
sidered whether the employee had goodwill that should be subject
to division at dissolution of the marriage.' 7 ' Fenton, however, recog-
nized excess earnings as being synonymous with goodwill. Fenton
observed that the excess earnings resulting from the existence of good-
will would continue to benefit the husband whether he continued as
an employee or became an independent contractor. 72 An examina-
tion of the decision in Fenton establishes the preferability of recognizing
excess earnings as community property to limitation of the profes-
sional goodwill doctrine.
B. Marriage of Fenton
In Fenton, the husband was a prominent attorney in the county
where the couple resided.'" The husband was noted for his good health
and excellent professional reputation, with annual earnings in excess
of $100,000, the highest earnings in his law firm.'74 He had been in
practice for more than twenty-five years, and expert testimony revealed
that his earnings were considerably greater than that of his peers.'
166. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 898, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
167. See id.
168. See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
169. 134 Cal. App. 3d 451, 184 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1982).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 463, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 456, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
174. Id. at 457, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
175. Id. at 463, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
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The husband owned approximately a five and one half percent in-
terest in the law corporation that employed him.' 76 This interest was
held pursuant to a stock purchase agreement excluding any allowance
for goodwill in sale of shares of the corporation. " 7
Upon marital dissolution, the trial court concluded that since the
stock purchase agreement precluded an allowance for goodwill of the
corporation, no divisible community goodwill could exist.' 78 The deci-
sion of the trial court was based upon the fact that ownership of
an interest in the law corporation would not produce income. " The
court noted that income could be produced only through an employ-
ment contract and believed that since the employment contract in this
case did not transfer the benefit of whatever goodwill the law cor-
poration possessed, the husband had no divisible goodwill.' 80
On appeal, the court reversed and held that the community assets
included both the goodwill of the husband and his interest in the
law corporation.'"' In considering the goodwill issue, the Fenton court
specificially mentioned several factors important to the conclusion that
the employee in this case had goodwill.' 2 First, the court observed
that the husband was the highest wage earner employed by the firm.'83
Second, the court noted that the husband had been in practice for
over twenty-five years and that he had an excellent reputation in the
community.' 4 Most notably, the court observed that the experience
and excess earnings capacity of the husband was a community asset,
indirectly creating excess earnings whether the husband continues as
an employee of the law firm or begins a solo practice.8 5 The court
then held that the goodwill of the husband could not be eliminated
by mere recitals in corporate documents and remanded the case for
a determination of the value of the goodwill.' 6
The Fenton decision represents a more practical approach than that
taken by the court in Rosan.'87 By recognizing the economic conse-
quences of the monetarily successful marital community, both spouses
are compensated appropriately.' The court addressed the economic
176. Id. at 465, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
177. See id. at 461, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
178. Id. at 460, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 463-65, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 602-03.
182. Id. at 463, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. See id.
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realities of the marital community by separately considering the com-
munity interest in excess earnings and the community interest in the
law corporation. 8 9 In considering whether the employee had any divisi-
ble goodwill, the court acknowledged that since the employed spouse
will continue to enjoy the benefit of excess earnings after separation
and dissolution, the excess earnings are to be considered a community
asset. 9 ' Thus, the community property division of excess earnings
in this case was not subject to the unrelated issue of whether the
spouse was an employee or owner as in Rosan.'9' Treatment of excess
earnings as a community asset, therefore, avoids the vagaries associated
with the application of historical definitions and treatment of
goodwill.'
CONCLUSION
Traditional definitions of goodwill require the existence of a con-
ventional business concern prior to recognition that goodwill may exist.
Similarly, a narrow reading of the professional goodwill doctrine re-
quires a proprietary interest in a professional practice or business as
a condition to recognition that divisible goodwill may exist in a marital
dissolution proceeding. This author has established that traditional
definitions of goodwill should not bar a finding that an employee
may have goodwill subject to division as community property. A
realization that the professional goodwill doctrine is an implicit recogni-
tion that excess earnings are divisible as community property allows
the expansion of the professional goodwill doctrine to employees. Since
excess earnings result from the existence of goodwill, courts can use
the factors currently employed to decide whether goodwill exists in
order to determine whether excess earnings exist in a particular case.
In recent cases that have considered whether excess earnings of an
employee should be subject to division as an asset of the marital com-
munity, the more well reasoned decisions have ignored the business
form under which the excess earnings are produced. These decisions
have addressed the economic consequences of the existence of com-
munity excess earnings by appropriate division of those earnings as
community property.
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189. See id. at 460-65, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 600-03.
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191. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
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